Vaccination policy and trust

verfasst von

Artyom Jelnov, Pavel Jelnov

Abstract

A corrupt government may not only fail in provision of public goods but also generate mistrust that depresses demand for essential public goods. The effect of corruption on supply of public goods is well studied, but much less is known about the demand side. Using UNICEF panel data on vaccination, we find that countries perceived as less corrupt and more liberal experience higher vaccination rates. Furthermore, they are less likely to adopt a mandatory vaccination policy. We show theoretically that the mechanism that generates this result is the lower probability of a transparent and accountable government to promote an unsafe vaccine.

Organisationseinheit(en)

Institut für Arbeitsökonomik

Externe Organisation(en)

Ariel University Center of Samaria

Typ

Artikel

Journal

Economic modelling

Band

108

ISSN

0264-9993

Publikationsdatum

03.2022

Publikationsstatus

Veröffentlicht

Peer-reviewed

Ja

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie

Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung

SDG 3 – Gute Gesundheit und Wohlergehen, SDG 16 – Frieden, Gerechtigkeit und starke Institutionen

Elektronische Version(en)

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2022.105773 (Zugang: Geschlossen)
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/250608 (Zugang: Offen)