How To Model The Probabilities of Conditionals
David Lewis (and others) have famously argued against Adams's Thesis (that the probability of a conditional is the conditional probability of its consequent, given it antecedent) by proving various "triviality results." In this paper, I argue for two theses -- one negative and one positive. The negative thesis is that the "triviality results" do not support the rejection of Adams's Thesis, because Lewisian "triviality based" arguments against Adams's Thesis rest on an implausibly strong understanding of what it takes for some credal constraint to be a rational requirement (an understanding which Lewis himself later abandoned in other contexts). The positive thesis is that there is a simple (and plausible) way of modeling the probabilities of conditionals, which (a) obeys Adams's Thesis, and (b) avoids all of the existing triviality results.
Speaker
Prof. Dr. Branden Fitelson
Organiser
Institut für Philosophie
Prof. Dr. Feest und Prof. Dr. Frisch
Date
04. July 201916:15 o'clock - 18:00 o'clock
Location
Institut für PhilosophieBuilding: 1146
Room: B313
B313
Im Moore (Hinterhaus) 21
30167 Hannover