Anti-Dumping or Pro-Collusion? How Trade Policy can Enforce International Cartels


As the WTO continues to bring down tariff walls around the world, non-tariff barriers - such as anti-dumping provisions (AD) - are on the rise. But, as this proposal argues, the shift in policy is not just a "waterbed" effect of shifting from tariff to non-tariff protection. Anti-dumping measures may be used to selectively target the most efficient producers, while tariffs are generally non-discriminatory. One contribution of the project is to investigate the joint use of tariffs and AD, and to determine whether the two policy tools are substitutes or complements. Moreover, the selective nature of AD may also have important implications for market competition. Building on standard trade models, we will test how the presence of anti-dumping measures affects the sustainability of cartels. Working with a unique dataset covering Russia, a recent WTO member, the project will test the theoretical implications empirically.

Project duration: 24 months


Prof. Dr. Arevik Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan